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1 Introduction 
1.1 Background 
The subject of humanitarian intervention in international relations and its legitimacy, has 
been debated for the long period of time.The concept of state sovereignty, which derives 
both from customary law and the UN Charter, as defining principle of interstate relations, 
stands in direct conflict with legality of the doctrine of humanitarian intervention because 
of the principle of non-intervention, which denounces all forms of interference in the 
internal affairs of sovereign states. 
The principle of state sovereignty remains one of the  fundamentally important principles 
in the international law and has the main  role in the maintenance of world order and peace. 
On the  other side, the increasing international concerne for human rights protection and 
humanitarian necessities have led to armed interference by one or several states  into 
internal affairs of another state and to violation of sovereignty of target state. The two 
columns of international law – state sovereignty and concern for human rights are in state 
of tension, and the greatest challenge of both theorists and practitioners is to solve it. 
Opinions of scholars, politicians and state practice still disagree regarding the question 
whether the right to intervene exists and  what is its normative range. 
Extensive changes of the world occurred with the end of the Cold War. International 
community, no longer characterized by two major powers set against each other, 
confronted with many challenges that led to the re-examining of the notion of sovereignty 
and intervention. The central points of debate are the questions: why the concept of state 
sovereignty should be re-defined, who should perform interventions and how. 
There is a division amongst theorists regarding those questions. One viewpoint is that 
intervention for the sake of humanity cannot be permissible, justifiable or legal. The other 
is that forcible action to stop serious human rights deprivations is permitted by 
international law. 
The contradictory nature of the term of humanitarian intervention was the reason I found it 
most interesting to study and analyse in the field of international law. In addition, as a 
citizen of Serbia (FRY at the time), I personally witnessed  the  humanitarian intervention 
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that is, by the great number of examiners, considered the most controversial due to the fact 
that it was undertaken without the UN authorization; nevertheless I tried to be as objective 
as possible. Both reasons  mentioned, made this topic for me an exceptional challenge.  
1.2 Object and purpose of the study 
Throughout this paper I will examine the notion of the doctrine of humanitarian 
intervention and its relation with state sovereignty as the fundamental principle and the 
basis of the modern world order. The purpose of this thesis is to determine whether armed 
humanitarian intervention undertaken to prevent or stop serious human rights violations is 
legal and legitimate. 
1.3 Sources and methodology 
The topic of humanitarian intervention demands interdisciplinary approach – from human 
rights, international relations, politics to ethics and philosophy - since ethical, legal and 
political conditions are all relevant to the evaluation of the doctrine. In this paper I also 
examined state practice. My approach to the topic requires the use of research methods 
from the social sciences. The main sources used in this paper are the UN Charter, GA 
Resolutions, the 2001 ICISS Report “The Responsibility to protect” , the 1969 Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties and books and journals written by legal scholars and 
theorists. 
1.4 Demarcation of thesis 
This thesis attempts to establish whether a legal and legitimate basis for humanitarian 
intervention exists. Exploring legal basis, it examines both customary law and the UN 
Charter. Searching for legitimate basis for  the doctrine, it investigates are there the 
minimum duties of states in protecting the rights of their citizens as elements of their 
sovereignty and what  is that minimum; does unobservance of these duties, if they exist, 
justify humanitarian intervention and in which way it can be successfully employed. 
Analysing the evolution of the doctrine and practice of humanitarian intervention, this 
paper tries to find the solution of this issue. 
1.5 Structure of the study 
In order to reach a conclusion, Chapter 2 discusses the concepts of sovereignty and 
humanitarian intervention, their definitions, purposes and limits, historical evolution and 
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three basic theoretical approaches to the doctrine of humanitarian intervention. It concludes 
that state sovereignty co-existed with the principle of unilateral humanitarian intervention 
since the establishment of the state system, that unilateral humanitarian intervention was 
widely accepted as legal under customary law before UN Charter and that the concept of 
sovereignty has been re-defined. 
Chapter 3 discusses the status of  humanitarian intervention under the UN Charter, 
examining the provisions of the Charter on the use of force and textual, intent and policy 
arguments of theorists. It concludes that unilateral humanitarian intervention is not 
permitted by the UN Charter. 
Chapter 4 examines whether the doctrine of humanitarian intervention has evolved into a 
rule of customary international law. Analysing the process of formation of customary rules 
in international law, it concludes that unilateral humanitarian intervention is gradually 
developing into a rule of customary law, but not fully took shape yet. 
Chapter 5 is a case study of  humanitarian interventions that occured in pre-Charter, post-
Charter and post-Cold War era. It concludes that during the nineteenth and early twentieth 
century the doctrinal writings and the state practice were in favor of the recognition of the 
right of humanitarian intervention, that the UN Charter did not find it inconsistent with the 
purposes of  the UN, that during the Cold War period the doctrine did not enjoy wide 
support in state practice, whilst post Cold-War practice suggests that states employ more 
extensive conception of humanitarian intervention and a growing support for the doctrine. 
Finally, I conclude that the doctrine of unilateral humanitarian intervention has a 
significant role in interaction of the members of international community and although it is 
not permitted under international law it should be allowed in cases of massive violations of 
human rights. Considering that there is a possibility of abuse, the use of the doctrine must 
be regulated in a clear and precise way. 
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2  Sovereignty and humanitarian intervention 
2.1 State sovereignty and the principle of non-intervention 
Sovereignty of states is the foundation of interstate relations for the past several centuries. 
It is also the basis of the modern world order. But the idea of sovereignty traces back to 
ancient Rome where was formulated  as the power of the Emperor and to XVI century 
when Jean Bodin  defines the sovereign as a ruler subjected only to the natural law, divine 
law and the law of nations. Sovereignty is “the most high,absolute and perpetual power 
over the citizens and subjects in a Commonweale…the greatest power to command.”1 
Hugo Grotius defined sovereignty as “that power whose acts are not subject to the control 
of another, so that they may be made void by the act of any other human will.”2 Thomas 
Hobbes “regarded sovereignty as absolute,unified,inalienable,based upon a voluntary but 
irrevocable contract”3 According to the number of international law researchers, the 
concept of state sovereignty was established in the Treaties of Westphalia in 1648 which 
ended almost three decades of war in Europe and iniciated new order, based on the national 
sovereignty. The Peace of Westfalia “did not sanction the right of rulers to do whatever 
they pleased within their own territories”4 
As the idea of the final and absolute authority in the state, the concept of sovereignty is 
recognized in the United Nations Charter as one of the main principles of international law. 
The principle of the sovereign equality of all states is adopted in art. 2(1) of the UN 
Charter. The prohibition of interference in the domestic affairs of sovereign states by other 
sovereign states, especially of the threat of use of force lays down in art. 2(4). In order to 
promote the sovereignty of states UN Charter  in art. 2(7) stipulates that  “nothing 
containded in the present  Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in 
matters that are essentially within the domestic  jurisdiction of any State or shall require 
the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter.” 
                                                          
1
 J.Bodin, Six books of Commonweale,bk.1,chp.8 at 84, quoted in F.K.Abiew, The Evolution of the Doctrine 
and Practice of Humanitarian Intervention at 27 (Kluwer,1999) 
2
 Quoted in Ibid. 
3
 Ibid. 
4
 Ibid. 
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The meaning, purpose  and limits of sovereignty, was also  the subject of the mandate of 
the Independent International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) 
which was established in order to promote a  global debate on the relationship between 
intervention and state sovereignty and to reconcile the international community‟s 
responsibility to act facing with massive violations of humanitarian norms while respecting 
the sovereign rights of states. 
ICISS  also concludes that  state sovereignty  is the concept that „‟lies at the heart of both 
customary international law and the UN Charter and remains both an essential component 
of  the maintenance of international peace and security and a defence of weak states 
against the strong.” According to the ICISS, “state sovereignty denotes the competence, 
independence and legal equality of states. ”Every state is free to choose its own political, 
economic, cultural and social system as well as the formulation of the foreign policy. The 
scope of the freedom of choice of states in these matters is not unlimited; it depends on 
developments in international  law (including agreements made voluntarily) and 
international relations.” 
The limits of the principle of state sovereignty has always been in dispute, but some of 
them are widely accepted. According to the UN Charter, sovereignty is not a barrier to 
actions of the Security Council when taking measures in the cases of  “a threat to the 
peace, a breach of the peace or an act of aggression.”5 Further, state sovereignty cannot be 
the excuse for non-performance of international obligations of the states, both customary 
and treaty. Sovereignty brings with it responsibility for states to protect persons and 
property within their territories. 
In Kofi  Annan‟s article on the “two concepts of sovereignty” in The Economist, he argues:  
 
 
State sovereignty, in its most basic sense, is being redefined – not least by 
the forces of globalization and international co-operation. States are now 
widely understood to be instruments at the service of their peoples, and not 
vice versa. At the same time individual sovereignty – by which I mean the 
fundamental freedom of each individual, enshrined in the Charter of the 
UN and subsequent international treaties – has been enhanced by a 
renewed and spreading consciousness of individual rights. When we read 
the Charter today, we are more than ever conscious that its aim is to protect 
individual human beings, not to protect those who abuse them. 
                                                          
5
 UN Charter, art. 39 
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Despite the crucial role of the state sovereignty notion in international relations, it has been 
confronting certain challenges particularly since last decades of the 20th century. 
2.2 Definition of humanitarian intervention 
The meaning of intervention as various forms of nonconsensual action, can be defined 
broadly, including even verbal remarks and narrowly, including only oppressive 
interference of one state regarding internal affairs of another. Many analysts consider that 
expression „humanitarian intervention“ combines two contradictory terms, but it is 
employed in almost all academic and policy literature. The term ‟‟humanitarian‟‟ in this 
expression, plays the role of justification for intervention. 
 During the 19th century the term „intervention on the grounds of humanity“ was used to 
describe operations involving assistance and intervention in internal affairs of a state. At 
the end of 1980s the term ‟‟right to intervene‟‟ was used to describe both operations 
carried out by individual States and action taken by international organizations and NGO‟s. 
The term „intervention“ in international law refers to prohibited intervention. According to 
Teson, basically three forms of „intervention‟‟ can be distinguished, depending on the 
degree of coercion employed. In the first place intervention simply means discussion, 
examination and the recommendatory action. Second, it refers to the taking of measures 
that are coercive in nature but short of the use of force. Finally, it is used to refer to the use 
of force in the domestic affairs of another state.
6
 
There is no generaly accepted definition of humanitarian intervention. Fernando Teson 
defines it as „the proportionate transboundary help, including forcible help, provided by 
governments to individuals in another state who are being denied basic human rights and 
who themselves would be rationally willing to revolt against their oppressive 
government.“7 The concept also can be defined as ‟‟the reliance upon force for the 
justifiable purpose of protecting the inhabitants of another state from treatment which is so 
arbitrary and persistantly abusive as to exceed the limits of that authority within which the 
sovereign is presumed to act with reason and justice.
8
 One possible definition runs as 
follows: “The theory of intervention on the ground of humanity ... recognizes the right of 
                                                          
6
 Fernando Teson, Humanitarian Intervention at 133 (2
nd
 ed. 1997) 
7
 Fernando Teson, Humanitarian Intervention: An Inquiry into Law and Morality at 5 (1988) 
8
 F.K.Abiew,The Evolution of the Doctrine and Practice of humanitarian intervention, at 31 (Kluwer,1999) 
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one State to exercise international control over the acts of another in regard to its internal 
sovereignty when contrary to the laws of humanity.“9 
Although not identical, those definitions express what the doctrine of humanitarian 
intervention involves. Common features of all definitions are, first, the use of armed force 
and second, justification for the use of force depends on human rights violations in the 
target state. 
2.3 Historical evolution of the principle of humanitarian intervention 
2.3.1 The Law of Nature 
Greek philosophers argued about the existence of a law whose content is set by nature and 
therefore has validity everywhere. The „father of natural law“, Aristotle posited the 
existence of natural justice or natural right and made some fundamental postulations about 
it: “One part of what is politically just is natural, and the other part legal. What is natural is 
what has same validity everywhere alike.“10  
Stoics, the followers of  a school of Hellenic philosophy, developed the tradition of natural 
justice. According to them, the natural law consisted of  means by which a rational beings 
lived in accordance with order of the universe. 
Natural law theories have influenced the development of English common law and are 
presented in works of Thomas Aquinas, Thomas Hobbes, Hugo Grotius, John Lock and 
some others. 
The essential feature of the Law of Nature  that all human beings is to be treated equally 
represents the foundation of the concept of inherent human rights. 
2.3.2 Just war theories 
The moral-political theory of just war (bellum justum) is historically strongly connected 
with the doctrine of humanitarian intervention. For the ancient Greeks, the war could be 
waged only if the cause of it was justified. 
A philosopher and theologian St.Augustine (354-430), thoroughly influenced by Platonic 
doctrines, framed the concepts of original sin and just war. According to St.Augustine, 
                                                          
9
 Ibid. 
10
 Aristotle,The Ethics of Aristotle:The Nichomachean Ethics 20 (1953) 
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there are two key concepts of just war – a just cause and a right intention. He defined the 
just war „in terms of the avenging of injuries suffered, where the guilty party has refused to 
make amends. War was to be embarked upon to punish wrongs and restore the peaceful 
status quo, but no further: Agression was unjust and the recourse to violence had to be 
strictly controlled.“11  
St Thomas Aquinas in the 13th century defined the just war as „the subjective guilt of the 
wrongdoer that had to be punished rather than the objectively wrong activity. He wrote that 
war could be justified provided it was waged by the sovereign authority, it was 
accompanied by a just cause  (i.e. the punishment of wrongdoers) and it was buttressed by 
the right intentions on the part of the belligerents.“12 
With the rise of the modern age and of the European nation-states, the doctrine changed 
and became tied to the sovereignty of states. The new state of international affairs was 
reflected by the necessity of serious attempts at a peaceful resolution of the dispute that 
was required before turning to force. “Thus the accent in legal doctrine moved from the 
application of force to suppress wrongdoers to a concern (if hardly apparent at times) to 
maintain order by peaceful means.“13 
The just war theory also entailed the immunity of innocent persons from direct attack and 
the proportionate use of force to conquer the enemy. 
Hugo Grotius (1583-1645), widely considered the father of international law, laid the 
foundations for international law based on natural law. He separated the law of nature from 
the law of God and built his Law of Nations on his view of the Law of Nature. Grotius 
believed that the sovereign powers of the state were limited to the extent of  the rights 
ceded by individuals. It follows that in the case of violation of the basic rights of the people 
by sovereign, he exceeded his jurisdiction and other states had the right to intervene in 
order to re-establish the order of the Law of Nature. Lauterpacht consider that  „Grotius 
[made] the first authoritative statement of the principle of humanitarian intervention – the 
                                                          
11
 Malcolm Shaw, International Law at 415 
12
 Ibid. 
13
 Ibid. 
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principle that exclusiveness of domestic jurisdiction stops when outrage upon humanity 
begins.“14 
According to Grotius, intention was irrelevant for the justice of war, but he considered in 
detail the justifiable means of waging war. He advocated the theory of proportionality, 
claiming that every mean that is not necessary for achieving the just cause, would be 
unjust. In his significant work De Jure Belli ac Pacis ( On the Law of War and Peace), he 
argues that there are some circumstances that can justify the war and identifies three „just 
causes“ for war: self-defence, reparation of injury and punishment. In this work Grotius 
consider both questions of jus ad bellum (justice in the resort to war) and of jus in bello 
(justice in the conduct of war). He considered the killing of civilians, raping of women 
from the enemy side and forcing of innocent people into slavery the crimes of war. 
Sometimes, the norms that are essentially prohibited may be violated justifiably because of 
the necessities of war: „We may bombard a ship full of pirates or a house full of thieves, 
even if there are within the same ship or house a few infants, women or other innocent 
persons.“15 
Natural law theorists of 16th and 17th centuries considered that humanitarian intervention 
is in conformity with the law of nature and that it is the essential part of the bellum justum 
doctrine . According to natural law, a state could intervene in the affairs of another if 
certain conditions were present. 
2.3.3 Changes in Western philosophical political and legal theory 
Views of Grotius presented in his works had a strong infulence on Western political and 
legal theory. 
The treatises of Italian Rennaisance diplomat and political philosopher Niccolo 
Machiavelli, The Prince and The Discourses on Livy , suggest reconsidered morality in 
which consolidation of political power in the state is considered the highest human benefit, 
replacing all other ethical values and limitations. Machiavelli realized that there were no 
limitations on the power of the Princes in the renaissance Europe.  
                                                          
14
 H.Lauterpacht, quoted in P.Malanczuk, Humanitarian Intervention and the Legitimacy of the Use of Force 
at 7 (Amsterdam,Het Spinhuis 1993) 
15
 Hugo Grotius,De Jure Belli ac Pacis Prolegomena,III,I,para4(1),(1625) 
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He read the Bible as a secular text like a classical history work. Such approach allowed 
him to understand the role of religion in political life. The universal theory of rising and 
falling of nations that Machiavelli posted, came as the result of what he learned from the 
Bible about formation of Israel and from the classics about the formation of Greece and 
Rome. He observes that the foundation of new states is often preceded by exodus and 
migration and made analysis of the special character of  leaders, that are distinguished of 
others by their virtues. Machiavelli regards human political power rather than divine 
power, but he doesn‟t discount the significance of religion, considering it  essential in the 
governance of the state, “essential instrument for producing the belief that sustains 
identification and loyalty....Religion is effective in generating belief because it can 
intimidate the populace with words rather than requiring physical force.“16   
For Machiavelli, the war was the most important aspect of statecraft. ‟‟When it is a 
question of the safety of the country no account should be taken of what is just or unjust, 
merciful or cruel, laudable or shameful, but without regard to anything else, that course is 
to be unswervingly pursued which will save the life and pursue the liberty of the 
[fatherland] ‟‟17 His work The art of war, a thorough study of classical and contemporary 
military practices, was a practical proposition to the rulers of Florence, in which he 
explained the advantages of militia. 
One of the first theorists that developed a consistent theory of sovereignty was French 
jurist and political philosopher Jean Bodin, whose notion of sovereignty was that the power 
of the sovereign must be absolute and permanent. For Bodin, a sovereign prince is one who 
is exempt from obedience to the laws of his predecessors and those issued by himself. A 
sovereign is however subjected to natural law.
18
 
English philosopher Thomas Hobbes is remembered for his work on political philosophy 
and modern founder of the social contract tradition. In Leviathan, his main work, he set out 
his doctrine of the foundation of societies and legitimate governments and rejected the 
doctrine of separation of  powers, due to the fact that the work was written during the 
English Civil War. That was the reason why he demonstrated  the necessity of a strong 
central authority to avoid the conflict and civil war. Any misuse of  power that could 
happen by this authority must be accepted as the price of peace. 
                                                          
16
 Steven Marx,Moses and Machiavellism,The Journal of American Academy of Religion,1997 
17
 N.Machiavelli,The Prince,1513 
18
 Bodin,On Sovereignty, Cambridge Texts in Social and Political Thought, 1992 
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According to Hobbes, people had formed societes to protect them from anarchy, because 
without society, people would live in state of nature where  anyone can do anything he 
likes which inevitable leads to conflict. Civil society is therefore established by a social 
contract, in which each member of society gain civil rights but must be subjected to the 
civil law or political authority, a government. Sovereign power is not a party of the 
contract and not bound by it. Equaly important to social contract theory was English 
philosopher John Locke whose ideas influenced Voltaire, Rousseau and many Scottish 
Enlightenment thinkers. John Locke has also been cited as a primary influence on the 
American and French Revolutions and 1776 American Declaration of Independence. He 
believed that human nature is characterized by reason and tolerance and that in a natural 
state all people were equal and everyone had a natural right to defend which was not 
enough, so people established a civil society to resume conflicts. Locke believed that 
revolution in not only a right but, under some circumstances, an obligation and advocated 
governmental separation of powers. 
The religious wars that were waged during the 16
th
 and 17
th
 centuries were the milieu in 
which these theories of sovereignty were developed. The Treaty of Westphalia, which 
ended the thirty years of war in Europe and established the nation-state as the main actor in 
international law, was a legal confirmation of this principle. The important limitation of the 
sovereignty was the right of minorities within the sovereign state, to practice religion they 
choose. 
In the 18
th
 and 19
th
 century the theory of sovereignty differed and the principle of non-
intervention was developed. The sovereignty of the nation-state was not restricted by the 
reasons of humanity or justice and humanitarian intervention was not regarded as lawful. 
However, a limited right of intervention on humanitarian grounds was recognized by 
Vattel and some other scholars of the time.”If the prince, attacking the fundamental laws, 
gives his people a legitimate reason to resist him, if tyranny becomes so unbearable as to 
cause the Nation to rise, any foreign power is entitled to help an oppressed people that has 
requested assistance.”19 
According to Abiew, ”authorities on international law considered humanitarian 
intervention to be in conformity with natural law….the nineteenth century saw the 
ascendancy of legal positivism as the basis of international jurisprudence” 
                                                          
19
 De Vattel,2Le Droit Des Gens,1863,Ch.IV,para.55,quoted in Supra note 8 at 36 
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By the end of nineteenth century, according to Brownlie, „the majority of publicists 
admitted that a right of humanitarian intervention....existed.“20 
The discussion above suggests that state sovereignty co-existed with the principle of 
unilateral humanitarian intervention since the establishment of the state system. In my 
opinion, the view that unilateral humanitarian intervention was widely accepted as legal 
under customary law before UN Charter is correct. 
2.4 Theoretical approaches to the humanitarian intervention 
According to Teson, there are three basic positions regarding humanitarian intervention: 
absolute noninterventionism, limited interventionism and broad interventionism. 
2.4.1 Absolute noninterventionism 
Absolute noninterventionists claim that the only justified use of force is the one against 
aggression, in self-defence. This position is adopted by most legal scholars. Among them is 
John Rawls, one of the most influential political philosopher of the 20
th
 century, famous as 
the most prominent theorist of distributive justice. Rawls claims that principles of justice 
for national societies are those that would be chosen in the „original position“ (a 
hypothetical situation developed by Rawls to replace the state of nature from the clasiccal 
social contract tradition) by free, rational parties. According to Rawls,  two principles 
would be chosen: the  principle of equal liberty and the „difference principle“. As liberty 
has priority over social and economic claims, Rawls calls this theory „justice as fairness.“ 
There is a considerable limitation on the applicability of this theory, that Rawls imposed. 
Rawls claims that civil and political human rights may sometimes be reduced or ignored, 
but only to limited extent, that is needed  to achieve conditions  that will make available 
the full enjoyment of those rights in the future.
21
 However, Rawls limited this theory of 
justice to the societies of democratic industrial West. According to Teson, this is the “ 
relativist version of justice.” 
Teson considered that this limitation has “important consequences for international human 
rights” and considered  this theory unacceptable: “Variations in political, legal and 
                                                          
20
 I.Brownlie,International Law and the Use of Force by States, at 338,quoted in Supra note 8 
21
 See J.Rawls, A Theory of Justice,1971 
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economic organization do not affect the universal validity of human rights derived from 
appropriate principles of critical morality.”22 
Rawls‟s theory of international law relies in the analogy between state and individual. The 
representatives of states, from the international original position would choose “familiar 
principles”: the first is that of the equality of  nations whose consequence is the principle of 
self-determination, so in a just international society nations are sovereign and hold the right 
of self-determination, which right is actually a rule of nonintervention. 
2.4.2  Limited interventionism 
Limited interventionists claim that humanitarian intervention is only acceptable in cases of 
extreme human rights breaches – genocide, mass murder or enslavement. This position is 
endorsed by most legal scholars who support humanitarian intervention. One of the most 
prominent contemporary political philosophers amongst them is Michael Walzer who was 
one of the developers of a pluralist approach to political and moral life. Amongst his 
contributions to the political theory are revitalizing the just war theory, the theory of 
“complex equality” and an argument that justice is primarily a moral standard within 
particular nations and societies and can not be developed in a universalized abstraction. 
For Waltzer, only genocidal or equivalent action justifies intervention. According to Teson, 
“Walzer defines the state as „union of people and government‟ and argues from there that 
foreign military intervention against governments is almost always wrong, even if its 
purpose or effect is to establish liberal or democratic institutions.”23 
Waltzer makes a distinction between domestic legitimacy which is singular in character 
and reflects democratic values of the citizens who have right to revolt against the dictators, 
and international legitimacy which is pluralist in character and reflects citizens‟ 
recognition of  “different patterns of cultural and political development”24 According to 
Teson, Walzer‟s principle of pluralism “indicates that there are local moralities (a 
Nicaraguan morality, a European morality, a Chinese morality) and not a system of moral 
political principles held valid for all persons regardless of geographical 
circumstances…….we must let the political process work, we should not speed it up 
                                                          
22
 Supra ,note 7 at 49 
23
 Ibid. at 92 
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artificially…..the outcome of the process may be a tyranny, but it is „their‟ tyranny.”25To 
Teson, the pluralism of Walzer “does not differ significantly from outright moral 
relativism.”26 
2.4.3 Broad interventionism 
Broad interventionism is the thesis that humanitarian intervention is acceptable in cases of 
serious human rights violations which need not to reach genocidal proportions. This view 
is defended by A.D‟Amato and Reisman as legal scholars and Luban and Doppelt as 
philosophers. 
In his work Just War and Human Rights, David Luban stands on position that a military 
intervention will be morally justified only if it maximizes the respect for human rights of 
everybody affected by the intervention.
27
 For Luban, all just wars, including wars in self-
defence, are human rights-based wars. Teson argued : “Such a position, however, seems to 
be inconsistent with a theory based on individual rights. In most cases of forcible 
intervention, a nation going to the war for a prima facie just cause cannot avoid inflicting 
suffering and death.”28 
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3  Humanitarian intervention and the UN Charter 
The initial site of any debate on the legality of the use of force in international law is article 
2(4) of the UN Charter that provides:  
“All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force 
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other 
manner inconsistent with the objectives of Purposes of the United Nations.” 
Article 51 and Chapter VII of the UN Charter formally recognize certain particular 
exceptions to the rule stated above.Article 51 provides: “Nothing in the present Charter 
shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack 
occurs against a member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken 
measures necessary to maintain international peace and security…” 
Chapter VII of the Charter also provides one clear exception to the non-intervention 
principle by granting powers to the Security Council to use force against any member state 
if the SC believes other measures, not involving the use of force, is not or would not be 
adequate in the maintenance or restoration of international peace and security.
29
  
Whether Article 2(4) of the Charter prohibits humanitarian intervention? Theorists are 
divided on the subject. The majority are of the view that humanitarian intervention is not 
legal under the UN Charter arguing that Article 2(4) cannot be interpreted in any way that 
will allow humanitarian intervention. Some even holds that the principle of non-
intervention has raised to the status of ius cogens  - a peremptory norm of general 
application for which no derogation is permitted.
30
 
Supporters of humanitarian intervention claim instead that it is legal under the Charter as 
one of the primary purposes of the Charter is the promotion of human rights. 
There are three basic approaches to treaty interpretation: the first one, called “objective”, 
focuses on the actual text and analysis of the words used. The second one, “ subjective”, 
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looks to the intention of the parties adopting the agreement. The third approach regards the 
objects and the purpose of the treaty as the key to the meaning of a treaty provision. 
In order to have true interpretation of a treaty provision all three approaches must be taken 
into account and it is impossible to exclude any of them: words employed, intentions or 
aims of the document. 
Articles 31 to 33 of the Vienna Convention comprise aspects of all three doctrines. 
According to Malcolm Shaw, “a joint “textual-intentions-teleological” approach is posited 
in the Convention on the Law of Treaties as the package solution to problems of resolving 
difficulties in understanding particular treaty provisions.”31 
3.1 Textual arguments 
Classicist conclude that the Charter prohibits the use of force for humanitarian purposes. 
According to them, there are only two exceptions to the prohibition of the use of force: an 
assertion of self defense or collective self defense and a Security Council authorization. 
The first exception permits the use of force in self-defense against armed attack and the 
second permits an action by the Security Council as an enforcement measure in the 
performance of its duty of maintaining or restoring world peace.
32
 In Article 2(4) in 
Historical Context, Gordon argues that if the framers of the Charter wanted to permit the 
use of force for humanitarian purposes they would have done so explicitly. 
Classicists invoke two GA Resolutions. The first one is Resolution 2625 that provides that 
“no state or group of states has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason 
whatever, in the internal or external affairs of another state.” The second one is  GA 
Resolution 3314 from 1974 as a non-binding recommendation to the UN SC on the 
definition for the crime of aggression. Although not binding, this definition is often cited in 
opposition to military action. According to the Resolution, there is a distinction between 
aggression and war of aggression. Only war of aggression constitutes a crime against 
international peace. The GA defined “aggression” as “the use of armed force by a State 
against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of another state…no 
justification of whatever nature, whether political, economic, military or otherwise, may 
serve as a justification for aggression.” 
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Classicists also claim that the right to self-defense is limited in the Charter and premise 
that claim on the fact that , according to the Charter, the state which has taken the action in 
self-defense, must inform the SC immediately. Once the SC takes measures, the right of 
self-defense becomes extinguished. 
Considering all arguments mentioned above, classicists reached the conclusion that 
humanitarian intervention is clearly illegal under the UN Charter. 
Unlike classicists, realists claim that Charter emphasizes the right of humanitarian 
intervention. Teson claims that the use of force is prohibited “a) when it impairs the 
territorial integrity of the target state; b) when it affects its political independence; or c) 
when it is otherwise against the purposes of the United Nations.
33
  First two tests are 
satisfied, because “a genuine humanitarian intrervention does not result in territorial 
conquest or political subjugation.”34Regarding the last, ”purpose” test, Teson concludes 
that humanitarian intervention is in accordance with one of the  fundamental purposes of 
the UN Charter – the promotion of human rights. 
Though both classicists and realists present credible arguments for their views, the 
classicists position is generally accepted. According to them, the mentioning of something 
means the exclusion of all that is not mentioned, thus the drafters could have specifically 
provided for humanitarian intervention. According to realists, if a provision can be 
interpreted reasonably without leaving any words redundant, that interpretation is 
preferable. 
3.2 Intent arguments 
Classicists argue that, in the event of a conflict between peace and justice, the two most 
important goals of the United Nations, the Charter chose peace. 
“Any time that conflict or tension arises between two or more of these values, peace must 
always constitute the ultimate and prevailing factor.”35  
Lauterpacht, that advocates  realist view, claim that the human rights provisions were 
adopted after  an extensive discussion and that makes a legal duty for nations to respect 
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them. Regarding the debate about the formulation “promotion of human rights” that was 
eventually put in the Charter instead of “protection of human rights”, he insists that such an 
omission is of little practical importance: 
“It would be out of keeping with the spirit of the Charter and, probably with the accepted 
canons of interpretation of treaties, to attach decisive importance to that omission (of the 
word “respect”). It would be otiose to the point of pedantry for the draftsmen of the 
Charter to incorporate an explicit provision of this nature in a document in which the 
principle of respect for and observance of human rights…is one of the main pillars or the 
structure of the Organization…”36  
It is clear that the drafters of the UN Charter had intention to stop both aggression and 
violations of human rights but not clear what was their intention regarding sacrifying one 
value for the other in case of conflict. 
3.3 Policy arguments 
According to Teson, ”if literal analysis and intent do not yield a solution, the way to 
proceed is to examine article 2(4) in the light of subsequent state practice.” 
“Supporters of humanitarian intervention claim that diplomatic practice has created an 
exception to article 2(4), or maintained a previously existing exception, legitimizing the 
use of force to remedy serious human rights deprivations. Critics claim that subsequent 
practice must be interpreted as forbidding humanitarian intervention.”37  
The failure of the collective security arrangements supports the thesis of the realists 
arguing  that states are allowed to preserve their right to intervene unilaterally when it is 
necessary,  because of the inability of the SC to perform its role effectively. According to 
Teson, “this is an application of the theory of rebus sic stantibus (fundamental change of 
circumstances)…….the total inaction of the UN to remedy serious human rights 
violations.”38  On the other hand, classicists claim that there is a possibility of abuse if 
unilateral humanitarian intervention is permitted and therefore it would be too dangerous to 
allow it. 
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In Corfu Channel Case, the ICJ declared that the action of the British Navy constituted a 
violation of Albanian sovereignty and that “the alleged right of intervention as the 
manifestation of a policy of force, such as has, in the past, given rise to most serious ab 
uses and such as cannot, whatever be the present defects in international organization, find 
a place in international law.”39 According to Teson, it is the example of rejection of the 
argument based on UN ineffectiveness by ICJ. 
Realists argue that the Charter system never functioned as it was the intention of the 
drafters. It is the fact that SC can be paralyzed by using the veto power of the permanent 
members. There are many examples of the UN failure to intervene in cases of massive 
human rights abuses. In the case of no assistance from the UN, realists contend that 
measures of unilateral use of force are in the best interest of the world. It is difficult to give 
a constructive response to this argument. 
3.4 Conclusion 
Since the UN Charter is a treaty, the principles of treaty interpretation laid down in the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, particularly Articles 31 and 32 are applicable, 
in order to ascertain whether humanitarian intervention is legal under the Charter. 
According to Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, a treaty shall be interpreted in 
good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning of the words of the treaty in their 
context, having regard to the object and purpose of the treaty.
40
 The context for the purpose 
of interpreting a treaty shall comprise the text of the treaty, its preamble and annexes.
41
 
If Article 2(4) of the UN Charter is read carefully, giving the words their ordinary meaning 
in their context and in the light of its purposes, the conclusion cannot be reached. Looking 
at the context of the Charter does not give answer to the question about legality of 
humanitarian intervention under it because both views on the interpretation of the Article 
2(4) are acceptable. 
The analysis of the UN Charter‟s preamble also gives no solution. It is stated in preamble 
that the members are determined to “save succeeding generations from the scourge of war” 
but at the same time  “to establish conditions under which justice and respect for the 
obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained”. 
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Due to the fact that, in order to maintain justice, force could be used, the two demands of 
the preamble are in direct conflict. One of them supports the legality of humanitarian 
intervention, the other does not. Of no help are also the object and purpose of the Charter 
because two opposing values, peace and justice are both purpose of the UN. 
Article 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties provides that, in the case that 
the ordinary meaning of a provision in a treaty is ambiguous, recourse may be had to 
supplementary means of interpretation, including preparatory work of the treaty (travaux 
preparatories) and the circumstances of its conclusion. 
There is not enough documentary evidence about the subject of travaux preparatories of 
the Charter, thus it cannot help in finding the true meaning of the Article 2(4) of the 
Charter. According to Teson, “there is a more general question whether the determination 
of original intent is feasible or relevant for our purposes. That international law should be 
interpreted today in the light of the 1945 intentions of the drafters of the Charter is a 
venturous proposition…..international treaties, especially organic once such as the UN 
Charter, should be interpreted in accordance with present purposes and expectations in the 
international community. But even conceding the relevance of the inquiry into original 
intent, an examination of the travaux preparatoires does not answer the question whether 
the framers intended to maintain the customary exceptions to the use of force, including 
humanitarian intervention.”42 
It is  difficult to conclude whether humanitarian intervention is legal or not under the UN 
Charter. Looking at particular treaties that preceded the UN Charter, like the Pact of the 
Arab League, leads to the conclusion that the use of force was prohibited: “recourse to 
force for the settlement of disputes arising between two or more member states of the 
League is prohibited.” 43 The 1947 Janeiro Treaty and 1948 Bogota Charter also prohibited 
the use of force, making reference to the UN Charter. A critical evaluation of the 
arguments of both classicists and realists indicates that the arguments of the former are 
more convincing. Considering that together with treaties mentioned, (in my opinion) the 
conclusion may be made that the UN Charter prohibits the unilateral use of force. 
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4 Humanitarian intervention under customary international law 
4.1 Definition of a custom 
It is common to distinguish the formal and the material sources of  law. The formal sources 
are those legal procedures and methods for the creation of rules of general application 
which are legally binding. The material sources provide evidence of the existence of 
legally binding rules of general application. Formal sources do not exist in international 
law, but the principle that the general consent of states creates rules of general application, 
as a substitute. A statement of this principle is the definition of custom in international 
law.
44
 
In international law, it is not simple to discover where the law is to be found and whether a 
particular proposition amounts to a legal rule, due to the lack of a legislature and a proper 
system of courts with compulsory jurisdiction to interpret and extend the law. However, 
international law does exist and can be determined.
45
 
Statute of the International Court of Justice  in Article 38.1(b) enumerates the sources of 
international law. It is widely recognized as the most authoritative statement as to the 
sources. The second source of international law listed in the Statute of  ICJ is “international 
custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law.” Custom is constituted by two 
elements, the objective one of “a general practice” and subjective one “accepted as law”, 
the so-called opinio iuris. The main evidence of customary law is to be found in the actual 
practice of states.
46
 
“In the case of custom, States, when participating in the norm-setting process, do not act 
for the primary purpose of laying down international rules. Their primary concern is to 
safeguard some economic, social or political interests. The gradual birth of a new 
international rule is the side effect of States‟ conduct in international relations.”47  
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Custom is to be distinguished from other rules that states may follow without a feeling of 
legal obligation. Those are rules of courtesy, friendship or convenience. Thus, in order to 
exist a rule of customary international law, there must be a practice that is followed by the 
majority of states in belief that there is a rule of law that requires such practice. 
4.2 Elements of custom 
The two elements of customary rules of international law , state practice and opinio juris, 
“need not to be both present from the outset.” At the early stage, “practice may thus be 
regarded as being imposed by social or economic or political needs (opinio necessitatis). If 
it does not encounter strong and consistent opposition from other States but is increasingly 
accepted…a customary rule gradually crystallizes. At this later stage if may be held that 
the practice is dictated by international law (opinio juris)”48 
4.2.1 State practice 
State practice  includes any act, articulation or other behavior of a state that discloses the 
state‟s conscious attitude with respect to its recognition of a rule of customary international 
law.
49
 
The International Law Commision in 1950 listed “Treaties, decisions of national and 
international courts, national legislation, diplomatic correspondence, opinions of national 
legal advisers, practice of international organizations” as forms of “Evidence of Customary 
International Law”.50  
According to Malanczuk, some of the evidences of customary law are published, like 
statements by government spokesmen made to the press, at international conferences and 
meetings of international organizations, but the vast majority of the material is not, like 
correspondence with other states and the advice which each state receives from its own 
legal advisers. 
In the writings of international laywers and judgments of national and international 
tribunals, which are mentioned in Article 38(1)(d) of the Statute of the International Court 
of Justice, sometimes evidence of customary law may also be found. Similarly, treaties can 
be evidence of customary law. If the treaty claims to be declaratory of customary law, or 
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intended to codify customary law, it can be quoted as evidence of customary law even 
against a state which is not a party to the treaty.
51
 
The evident state practice is also important in the formation of custom. In the Continental 
Shelf Case (Lybia v. Malta), the ICJ stated:  “It is of course axiomatic that the material of 
customary international law is to be looked for primarily in the actual practice and opinio 
juris of states even though multilateral conventions may have an important role to play in 
defining and recording rules, deriving from custom or indeed in developing them.” 
According to Brownlie, if the consistency and generality of state practice are proved, no 
particular duration is required. A long practice is not necessary. Complete uniformity is 
also not required, but substantial uniformity is. The leading pronouncements by the ICJ are 
to be found in the judgment in the  Asylum case: 
The party which relies on a  custom…must prove that this custom is established in such a 
manner that it has become binding on the other party…that the rule invoked…is in 
accordance with a constant and uniform usage practiced by the States in question, and that 
this usage is the expression of a right appertaining to the State granting asylum and a duty 
incumbent on the territorial State. This follows from Article 38 of the Statute of the Court, 
which refers to international custom „as evidence of a general practice accepted as law.‟ 52 
According to Malanczuk, as noted by the ICJ in the Fisheries case, minor inconsistencies – 
a small amount of practice which goes against the rule in question, do not prevent the 
creation of a customary rule if it is supported by a large amount of practice. On the other 
hand, where there is no practice against an alleged rule, a small amount of practice is 
sufficient to create a customary rule. General practice should include the conduct of all 
states, which can participate in the formulation of the rule or the interests of which are 
specially affected.
53
 
After NATO intervention on Kosovo, some writers, like O‟Connell, claim that even a 
single act may lead to the establishment of a rule of customary law if it is accompanied by 
a widespread support for the action.
54
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In the North Sea Continental Shelf, ICJ clarified that customary law may emerge even 
within a relatively short passage of time. According to Malanczuk, „the possibility of 
‟instant‟ customary international law, or ‟droit spontane‟, based upon opinio iuris only and 
without the requirement of any practice, however, has remained a matter of dispute....the 
very notion of ‟custom‟ implies some time element and ‟instant custom‟ is a contradiction 
in terms...“ Malanczuk  claims that the view is confirmed in the North Sea Continental 
Shelf cases where ICJ  carefully balanced the reduction of the time-element with a stronger 
emphasis on the scope and nature of state practice: 
 
 … Although the passage of only a short period of time is not necessarily, or of itself, a 
bar to the formation of a new rule of customary international law … an indispensable 
requirement would be that within the period in question, short though it might be, State 
practice … should have been both extensive and virtually uniform in the sense of the 
provision invoked; - and should moreover have occurred in such a way as to show a 
general recognition that a rule of law or legal obligation is involved.
55
 
4.2.2 Opinio juris  
In the formation of customary law, there is a psychological element (opinio juris sive 
necessitatis) ,usually defined as a conviction felt by states that a certain form of conduct is 
required by international law. But, in international law, besides the  rules imposing a duty 
there are also permissive rules, which permit states to act in a particular way without 
making such actions obligatory (for example, to prosecute foreigners for crimes commited 
within the prosecuting state‟s territory). In the case of permissive rule, opinio juris means a 
conviction that a certain form of conduct is permitted by international law, while 
traditional definition of opinio juris is correct in the case of a rule imposing a duty. 
Permissive rules can be proved by showing that some states have acted in a particular way 
and that other states that was affected by such acts have not protested.
56
 
The difference between permissive and rules imposing duties can be seen in Lotus case in 
1927 where the Permanent Court of Justice rejected the claim of France that the absence of 
previous criminal prosecutions by flag states of a victim of a collision on the High Seas 
became a legal custom. The Court held that: „only if such abstention were based on their 
(the states) being conscious of a duty to abstain would it be possible to speak of an 
international custom.“ 
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In the North Sea Continental Shelf cases in 1969, the International Court of  Justice had a 
similar approach. The Court held that , although the principle of equidistance was 
employed in the delimitation of the continental shelf cases between bordering states, there 
was no evidence to ascertain that...they so acted because they felt legally compelled to 
draw them in this way by reason of a rule of customary international law obliging them to 
do so – especially considering that they might have been motivated by other factors.“57  
It is difficult to pinpoint when the transformation of opinion necessitates to opinion juris 
took place, to make a practice a rule of law. The party alleging the existence of custom 
must prove its existence in order the other party be bound by the rule. For the formation 
and existence of rules of customary international law, both the practice and the opinio juris 
must exist simultaneously. In the Case of Nicaragua v. United States (Merits), the ICJ 
noted as follows: 
 
 In considering the instances of the conduct above described, the Court has to emphasize 
that, as was observed in the North Sea Continental Shelf cases, for a new customary rule 
to be formed, not only must the acts concerned „amount to a settled practice‟, but they 
must be accompanied by the opinio juris sive necessitates. Either the States taking such 
action or other States in a position to react to it, must have behaved so that their conduct 
is „evidence of a belief that this practice is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule 
of law requiring it. The need for such a belief, i.e. the existence of a subjective element, is 
implicit in the very notion of the opinio juris sive necessitatis 
58
 
From all discussed above, it can be concluded that the rule of customary international law 
that would permit unilateral humanitarian intervention is not yet fully crystalized. 
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5 Humanitarian intervention: state practice 
The main purposes of humanitarian intervention are the prevention of genocide and other 
mass murder of civilian populations by their own state, reducing of massive human rights 
abuses and maintaining regional and global security and stability. In the case of genocide 
or any other massive human rights abuses, the security of whole region is threatened and 
the result of that are refugees fleeing their home country searching for safety. 
 In this chapter I will give a note on pre-Charter practice and  analyse  several humanitarian 
interventions that have been undertaken in the post-Charter era(1945-1989)  , such as The 
East Pakistan (Bangladesh) Intervention of 1971, Vietnam‟s intervention in Cambodia of 
1978 and The Tanzanian Intervention in Uganda of 1979  and cases of Northern Iraq, 
Somalia, Rwanda, Bosnia and Kosovo that occurred in post-Cold War era. 
5.1 Pre-Charter practice 
According to Abiew, one of the earliest known instances of interventions on humanitarian 
grounds occurred in 480 B.C. when the Prince of Syracuse demanded from Carthaginians 
to refrain from the uncivilized custom of sacrificing their children to Saturn. He made that 
demand as one of the conditions of peace. Treaty of Augsburg from 1555 that ended the 
religious struggle between Catholics and Protestants established the rule “Cuius regio,eius 
religio” that allowed German princes to select the religion within the domains they 
controlled, but provided peaceful life for Protestant or Catholic minorities. 
The 1648 Peace of Westphalia is the most significant document of this period regarding 
protection of minorities. In order to end the war that lasted nearly three decades and to 
establish peace and order in Europe, this treaty established the supremacy of the sovereign 
authority within a system of independent and equal states but at the same time recognized 
some rights for both Protestants and Catholics.”…the Empire was obliged not to pass any 
legislation which would discriminate as between Catholics and Protestants.”59 
States intervented for humanitarian purposes during the 19
th
 and 20
th
  century, either 
collectively or unilaterally. The first example occurred in 1827 and was connected with a 
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conflict between Turkey and Greece, in which Great Britain, France and Russia took 
military action to protect Christians. In 1860, France employed its troops to stop the 
massacre of thousands of Christians in Syria. In 1877 Russia declared a war against Turkey 
because of cruel treatment of Christians in Bosnia, Herzegovina and Bulgaria. The 
Congress of the United States declared the right to intervene in 1898 and sent armed force 
to assist the Cuban rebels against Spanish domination. Bulgaria, Greece and Serbia 
intervened to protect Macedonian Christians from Ottomans in 1913. The intervention of 
Woodrow Wilson in Mexico in 1914 was also provoked by humanitarian apprehensions. 
According to Teson, ”the most important pre-Charter precedent for humanitarian 
intervention, however, is the Second World War itself. That war, the paradigm of a just 
war, was without any doubt a humanitarian effort.”60  
Teson considers that “the pre -1945 precedents are reaffirmed by post Charter practice” 
and that “a right of humanitarian intervention has been established since 1945, 
independently of what was the customary law prior to the United Nations Charter.”61  
The doctrinal writings of international scholars documented the legality of humanitarian 
intervention in cases of large-scale deprivations or flagrant violations of human rights. In 
addition, many cases of intervention justified  by humanitarian grounds during the 
nineteenth and early  twentieth century, constituted enough evidence of state practice to 
permit recognition of the right of humanitarian intervention. 
5.2 Humanitarian interventions in Post-Charter era  (1945-1989) 
5.2.1 The East Pakistan intervention of 1971 
Independent states of Pakistan and India were created  in 1947 after the partition of British 
India Empire. The province of Bengal was split into two separate entities of West Bengal, 
belonging to India and East Bengal, belonging to Pakistan. In 1955 East Bengal was 
renamed East Pakistan and after the Bangladesh Liberation War of 1971, became 
independent nation of Bangladesh. 
West Pakistan dominated politically and exploited the East economically. The political 
rights of the Bengali majority were discouraged by the very small percentage of East 
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Pakistani representation in central government. The East Pakistanis spoke Bengalese and 
considered themselves closer to Hindu civilization.
62
 
The uprising of Bengali people of East Pakistan for independence from Pakistan was the 
cause of lauching military operation of the West Pakistani army. The war broke up on 26 
March 1971 in which genocidal action lasted for several months, killing of unarmed 
Bengali and Hindu civilians, burning their homes and property. In order to fight the West 
Pakistan army, the guerilla groups and forces termed as the “Freedom Fighters”- Mukti 
Bahin ( Bangladesh Liberation Army ) were formed. India opened its border to allow 
Bangladeshi refugees safe shelter in refugee camps.
63
 
India supported the rebellion which led to Indo-Pakistani War of 1971. India intervened in 
order to curtail cases of mass murders and other human rights atrocities committed by the 
Pakistani army that caused the death of at least one million people and influx of over then 
million refugees to India. The huge number of refugees and no international action to the 
crimes against humanity made India to surrender the Pakistany Army in war that lasted 12 
days. After Pakistan‟s surrender to India-Bangladesh Joint Forces on 16 December 1971, 
people in Bangladesh celebrated the liberation.
64
 
India claimed  it was the lawful exercise of the right of self-defence and  that the action 
was necessary for the protection of Bengalis from gross violations of human rights by the 
Pakistani army and was supported by Soviet Union and other Eastern bloc states, while 
Pakistan, China and the USA accused India of aggression and argued it had no right to 
intervene. In the General Assembly, most delegates considered the situation in Pakistan as 
internal one asserting that India had to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of 
Pakistan. 
The Indian action can be justified on two grounds. First, Pakistan launched preemptive air 
strike, which  was an act of aggression and India acted in self-defence. The second ground 
is that action was based on humanitarian reasons. According to Teson, Indian action was 
legal because it was assistance to a people struggling for their right to self determination 
and because its objective was ending of genocide. Many commentators, like Fonteyne, 
consider this intervention “the clearest case of forceful individual humanitarian 
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intervention”. Some commentators consider it unlawful, claiming that India was politically 
interested in the secession of East Pakistan. 
United Nations demonstrated inability to deal with the situation during the period  of 
massacres. Inspite of the fact that, obviously, it was the matter of international interest to 
stop the massacres, no action was taken. The Security Council did not condemn the Indian 
intervention, despite its self-interested nature, because it achieved the task of protecting 
human rights. 
5.2.2 Vietnam‟s intervention in Cambodia of 1978 
Cambodia is a over 14 million people country in South East Asia, a successor state of the 
Buddhist Khmer Empire. It was a protectorate of France from 1863 to 1954 as part of the 
French colony of Indochina. Cambodia gained independence from France on November 9, 
1954 and became a constitutional monarchy under King Norodom Sihanouk. His regime 
attempted to keep its neutrality during the Vietnam War, but in early 1970, Lon Nol forces 
overthrew Sihanouk‟s regime. As a consequence, a civil war between the Khmer 
republican forces supported by USA and Khmer Rouge communists supported by North 
Vietnam and China, began.
65
 
The new regime renamed the country Kampuchea and started the process of reorganization 
in which massive violations of human rights occurred. In a period of three years, over 2 
million people were reported dead but despite it was considered as a genocide by the 
international community, no effective measures were taken to stop it. In December 1978, 
Kampuchea was invaded by the Vietnamese troops and the Kampuchean United Front for 
National Salvation. The Pol Pot regime was deposed and the new government, supported 
by Vietnam, was established.
66
 
The official position of Vietnam in the UN SC debate after the intervention was that there 
was two separate conflicts: the one between Vietnam and Kampuchea and civil war in 
Kampuchea as the other. Vietnam claimed that it used force after Kampuchean aggression, 
in self-defence and that it undertook military action against Cambodia because of the 
inhuman conditions to which Pol Pot‟s government subjected the citizens of Kampuchea. 
The Vietnam‟s position was supported in SC by the Soviet Union,Cuba,and some other 
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communist countries, but China, as a supporter of the Khmer Rouge, declared that Vietnam 
had commited aggression against Kampuchea. The Non-Aligned countries also held 
Vietnam responsible for violating the integrity of Kampuchea‟s territory. Some Western 
States also condemned the action.  
The Security Council was unable to adopt any resolution unlike General Asembly that 
adopted a number of them calling for the withdrawal of foreign forces from that country. 
“On the whole, it seems to be the case that international reaction to this case was shaped by 
the bitter Cold War rivalries rather than any concern for human rights atrocities prevalent 
before the Vietnamese intervention.” 67 
According to Abiew, it has been observed that Vietnam had other motives. ”It harboured 
territorial ambitions over Kampuchea and seized the opportunity, given the situation, to 
invade Kampuchea and install a puppet government….The danger here….is that while 
interventions may relieve the immediate reign of terror or the persecution of a particular 
group, they can also end up in the substitution of one oppressor by another.”68 
According to Leifer, “intervention was governed by strategic priorities and the 
international responses to that intervention by the corresponding priorities of interested 
parties.”69 Kampuchean case was “a perfect candidate for humanitarian intervention”.70 
As Abiew comments, “the failure of the international community, including the UN, to 
find a diplomatic solution or to take any concrete measures of response, left the 
Vietnamese course of action as the viable option and the immediate solution to end the 
atrocities that were being committed.”71 
5.2.3 The Tanzanian intervention in Uganda of 1979 
President Idi Amin‟s brutal tirrany came to an end in April 1979 when he was overthrown 
by Ugandan rebels helped by Tanzanian army units. Between Tanzania and Uganda there 
has been a series of border clashes and in October 1978 Ugandan troops occupied 710 
square miles of Tanzanian territory  after what Amin declared annexation of it. This 
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aggression was not condemned by the Organization of African Unity, but Uganda was 
urged to withdraw its forces. It occurred after 15 days, but harassment of the Tanzanians 
along the border continued. By February 1979 the Tanzanian army invaded Uganda ended 
Amin‟s regime and a new provisional government under Yusuf Lule was formed.72 
Tanzania grounded its intervention as a reaction to the aggression against it. After the 
capture of Kampala, Tanzania declared its limited objective and invoked humanitarian 
considerations as one of its objectives. The USA supported Tanzania from the beginning, 
although on grounds of self-defence. United  Kingdom, Zambia, Ethiopia, Angola, 
Botswana, Gambia and Mozambique also supported it strongly and Rwanda, Malawi, 
Canada and Australia quickly recognized new government. Only Sudan and Nigeria 
condemned the action considering it interfering in internal affairs of Uganda. 
Alleged justification for the Tanzanian intervention is self-defense. But many scholars 
argued that it was doubtful, because Tanzanian invasion was not necessary and  
proportional since its army stayed in Uganda for months after the overthrow of Amin. 
Most of commentators concluded that it was justified on humanitarian grounds. The 
intervention in effect ended the human rights violations and brutal regime of  Idi Amin, 
without annexing Uganda territory and spreading any political influence over it. 
These examples of state practice demonstrate the belief of states  they have right of 
unilateral humanitarian intervention that is grounded both from the Charter and customary 
law. The rule that human rights are a matter of international concern and that use of force 
is not prohibited in international law if used in order to remedy the most serious human 
rights violations, that is articulated, is the source from which opinio juris derives. But, as 
Wolf remarks, there is no consensus on the validity of such actions: 
“abstract declarations from…the  General Assembly condemning intervention in the 
broadest terms should not be taken as persuasive evidence of opinio juris…The 
inconsistency between nations‟theoretical statements on the prohibition on the use of force 
and their actual, real world responses to such use of force is manifest…In the final 
analysis, the conviction of most states and scholars who oppose humanitarian intervention 
is of questionable strength. When states are confronted with real-world instances of 
intervention to prevent mass slaughter which do not implicate intense global 
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rivalries,…they will not condemn them. And when scholars who support an absolute 
interpretation of the prohibition on the use of force are challenged with the moral 
imperative of terminating genocide, they will go no further than to label armed intervention 
as a meaningless „‟technical‟‟breach of law. In light of such de facto approval by scholars 
and states of every ideological tendency, an argument rejecting the legality of humanitarian 
intervention based on opinion juris is unpersuasive.”73 
The UN Charter  do not find the customary institution of humanitarian intervention 
inconsistent with the purposes of UN in the event of failure of collective action under the 
Charter. Analysis of state practice of this period that was made above, demonstrates that 
states consider that the right of unilateral humanitarian intervention is available option both 
under the Charter and customary international law. 
During the Cold War period, humanitarian values were obedient to geopolitical 
considerations and the doctrine of humanitarian intervention did not enjoy wide support in 
state practice, but there was a silent consent of the vast majority of states to it. 
5.3 The practice of humanitarian interventions in the post Cold –War era 
The disintegration of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War changed the 
international system regarding behavior of states and international institutions. 
International legal order was restructured and new world order, based on the rule of law 
was promised. 
“the conclusion of the Cold War likewise presented a once-in-a lifetime opportunity for the 
nations of the world, acting individually, collectively and through the UN, …. to help 
achieve the two principal purposes of the UN:  the maintenance of international peace and 
security and the promotion and encouragement of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms.”74  
The necessity of multilateral cooperation in dealing with international peace and security 
was widely accepted and the use of multilateral intervention became one of the 
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mechanisms employed by the international community in dealing with crisis. Even some 
countries of the third world, the traditional guardians of the principle of sovereignty, 
changed their attitudes. The fact that new era has begun, in which governments can no 
longer hide behind state sovereignty and violate the human rights of their citizens, was 
widely accepted. 
The UN General Assembly adopted resolution aimed at intensification of the coordination 
of the UN‟s humanitarian assistance in emergencies, as well as forcing non-consensual 
governments to permit aid to people in need during civil wars and other internal conflicts, 
in December 1991. The Security Council established larger and more complex UN 
peacekeeping missions and in 1992 the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations was 
created. It is obvious that the UN has begun to take seriously human rights violations that 
constitute threats to international peace and security. 
5.3.1 Northern Iraq 
The Kurdish population, that is estimated to be about 20 million are divided among four 
states of the Middle East region. The denial of their right to self-determination has been the 
part of policy of Arab colonial domination. The 1923 Treaty of Lausanne ignored the 
claims of the Kurds and divided Kurdish territory between Iraq and Iran. It was the cause 
of Kurds‟ continuos revolt against the rule of Baghdad and during the period from 1961 to 
1971 they were engaged in armed rebellion.
75
 Inspite the agreement of some measure of 
autonomy, the Iraqi government began “Arabization” program which meant the repression 
and deportations of Kurdish people. The Kurdish rebellion from 1980 was brutally  
crushed. From 1985, under Saddam Hussein‟s regime, a systematic program against the 
Kurdish was performed, including using of poison gas.
76
 
The concequences of the Gulf War in 1991 were again atrocities of Iraqi Kurds and exodus 
of over 1.5 million refugees into Turkey and Iran. The Allied powers policy of non-
intervention had to be reconsiderated because the Iraqi mistreatment of its Kurdish 
population started to threaten international  peace and security in the region and provided 
the legal basis for the action of Security Council. As the result of that action, the SC 
Resolution 688 was adopted. It condemned Iraqi‟s repression and demanded immediate 
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end of it and allowing access by international humanitarian organizations. The legitimacy 
of this Resolution was debated, with pro and contra opinions of certain states.
77
 
In “Operation Provide Comfort” , to protect the Kurds , troops from several countries were 
employed (United States, Britain, France and other). These countries considered 
Resolution 688 as the ground for their action. 
The UN action in Northern Iraq was the subject of the sovereignty debate. The conclusion 
of the debate was that “sovereignty and nonintervention could no longer shield genocidal 
and other repressive acts which are themselves forbidden by international law and 
treaties.”78 
According to Abiew, “some writers have noted the improbability of the birth of a new 
order, or caution against arriving at the conclusion that the case of the Iraqi Kurds sets 
clear precedent for humanitarian intervention. ”Regarding the allied action , Abiew 
concludes that “the allied action in Northern Iraq, for some, is neither reassuring as 
humanitarian intervention, nor does it signify the emergence of a new legal norm. It 
reinforces increasing fears that the global order that is being structured is maintained by a 
self-appointed cop whose actions are post-facto legitimized by the UN.” 
5.3.2 Somalia 
Somalia, whose population is split up into many clans, a country located in a Horn of 
Africa, is one of the few homogenous African states  with a common language and culture 
and a single religion, Islam, so the fact that civil strife occurred in it is confusing for some 
commentators. It became a fully independent republic in 1960 through a merger of the two 
former colonial territories, British and Italian Somaliland. After the assassination of the 
president Shermarke in 1969 the army seized power under Siad Barre, who suspended the 
1960 constitution and formed a military government. Barre‟s regime was unmitigated and 
lasted 22 years, during which period he established personality cult. The internal factor that 
caused the Somalian tragedy was a lack of skills of the Barre‟s government to cope with 
interclan rivalries and with worsening economic situation.
79
 During the Cold War, both 
superpowers considered their military presence in Somalia very important, and as the result 
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of their rivalry in the 1970s and 1980s, Somalia got considerable economic and military 
aid. With the end of Cold War United States and former Soviet Union withdrew their 
presence and their influence in Somalia was diminished. The military dictatorship and the 
regime of Siad Barre were weakened, and the government became increasingly totalitarian 
and resistance movements sprang up across the country. Eventually the Somali Civil War 
started in 1988. The dictatorship of Siad Barre came to an end in 1991 and various political 
movements that opposed his regime could not agree on  power-sharing. In the state of 
power vacuum, the state of chaos quickly spread throughout the whole country. Over 1.2 
million Somalis were displaced by the summer of 1992 and almost half of the population, 
about 4.5 million people were threatened with severe malnutrition, of which 300,000 
died.
80
 
Various humanitarian relief efforts failed due to extreme insecurity for UN agencies and 
NGOs in distributing relief assistance to the people in need. Given this situation, the 
Security Council adopted Resolution 733 on January 23, 1992. The aimes of this 
Resolution were to increase humanitarian assistance  and to facilitate the delivery of aid. 
In April 1992 the United Nations Operations in Somalia (UNOSOM 1) was established 
with a mandate to restore peace and protect humanitarian relief operations. Due to the fact 
that the truce was largely ignored and that the situation was deteriorating, the SC adopted 
Resolution 794 on December 3, 1992. This Resolution determined that “all necessary 
means” will be employed to “create a secure environment” for the delivery of humanitarian 
assistance.
81
 
In order to carry out this Resolution, the Unified Task Force (UNITAF) was established. It 
was United States led multinational force with the task to protect the delivery of food and 
other humanitarian aid. The operation was successful and in May 1993, US-led action was 
concluded and the responsibility passed over to the UN, which adopted Resolution 814 and 
established UNOSOM II allowing the use of force envisaged under Chapter VII. The 
responsibility of UNOSOM II were disarmament and reconciliation, restoration of 
stability, law and order in Somalia. This operation was not successful and the new 
Resolution 837 called for total disarmament. US forces under UN command carried out 
penalizing attacks in Mogadishu and suffered heavy casualties. The US and other countries 
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begun disengaging. Negotiations that were encouraging by UN were without success. It led 
to restricting UN forces tasks under the new Resolution 897. 
The general accepted opinion amongst commentators is that  Operation Restore Hope and 
UNOSOM II failed, not so much in respect of provision of humanitarian relief, but failed 
in preventing the recurrence of anarchy and chaos.
82
 
The case of Somalia was the first  “experiment” of the UN‟s new policy of using chapter 
VII for humanitarian purposes. The moral legitimacy of the operation was not in doubt. 
Regarding legal implications, the legitimacy of the operation was not in doubt too. There 
was no reservations of states and SC had no difficulty in calling a Somalian humanitarian 
catastrophe a threat to international peace and security under Resolution 794. But, 
considering the fact that Somali society was accustomed to statelessness and was 
disintegrated, neither the USA and the UN could cope with it. 
According to James Mayall , ”The wrong lessons were learned from Somalia because 
although all interventions in civil conflicts face comparably intractable problems, very few 
– Afghanistan and Kurdistan are two possible exceptions – are faced not merely with the 
corruption of central authority but by its total disappearance combined with powerful 
structural obstacles to its reconstruction. Failure in Somalia did not have to mean that any 
external intervention was bound to fail elsewhere in Africa, but that was how it was 
interpreted. If such interventions were doomed to fail, it was not because African conflicts 
have special characteristics that are general to them all, but as suggested earlier, because of 
contradictions in the concept of humanitarian intervention itself. It follows that replacing 
great power involvement by peace enforcement operations organized on a regional basis 
must be expected to face similar problems. The replacement may be politically expedient, 
but it does not represent a conceptual solution.”83  
5.3.3 Rwanda 
The Republic of Rwanda is the country of Great Lakes Region of east-central Africa with 
the densest population in continental Africa of approximately 10.1 million people with the 
majority of Hutu and the minority of Tutsi. The ethnic tensions between them traces back 
to  the Belgian colonial era where the Tutsi aristocracy  and second class status of Hutus 
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were established by ruling Belgian authorities. In the first two decades following Rwanda‟s 
independence, tensions between Tutsi and nationalist Hutu burned up as the preface of the 
civil war and genocide of the 1990s.
84
 
Upon the independence from Belgium in 1962, the thousands of Tutsi minority lost their 
lives in violent clashes and tens of thousands sought refuge. In a military coup in 1973, 
Hutu politician Habyarimana seized power, establishing the National Revolutionary 
Movement for Development (MRND) and a one-party state in which the Tutsi were not 
involved in Rwandese politics. Collapsing economy and food shortages also contributed to 
the dangerous political climate.
85
 
In October 1990, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) formed of exiled Tutsis initiated a 
military offensive into Rwanda from Uganda. A civil conflict of low intensity was waged 
for next three years and RPF demanded the return of all refugees and a government of ethic 
reconciliation. The international community protested human rights violations and the 
result was signing of the Arusha Accords in August 1993 between Habyarimana and RPF. 
Two days after the signing, the UN SC adopted Resolution 872 (1993) which established 
the UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) with the task to assist and supervise 
the implementation of the Arusha Accords.
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On April 6, 1994 Habyarimana and the President of Burundi were killed in a plane crash 
caused by the firing of rockets at Kigali airport. The result of this assassination was almost 
one million Rwandans massacred, 1.3 million fled to neighbouring countries and further 
2.2 million people internally displaced within four months in the most brutal and 
systematic slaughter of civilians ever witnessed on the African continent. 
The 2,700 UNAMIR troops were powerless in stopping the massacres. After the brutally 
killing of Rwandan Prime Minister and her Belgian UN guards, Belgium withdrew its 
military contingent and SC passed the Resolution 912 on April 21, 1994 reducing the 
number of UNAMIR troups to 270. As the situation continued to deteriorate, the SC 
unanimously passed Resolution 918, increasing the number of UNAMIR troops to 5,500 
and expanded the mandate to protection of displaced persons, refugees and civilians. 
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However, these troops were not deployed because the member states didn‟t provide the 
required number of them. 
“Operation Turquoise” from June 22 by July 2, 1994, authorized by UN and unilaterally 
undertook by France succeeded to set up a security zone in southwestern Rwanda. After 
the withdrawing, French forces handed over control of the security zone to the UN 
peacekeeping force composed primarily of African units.
87
 
France claimed that the nature of the operation was strictly humanitarian. The motives for 
the intervention has been questioned by some observers because of the French support to 
the Habyarimana government with troops and arms in its counter-offensives against the 
RPF in 1992 and 1993 and given France had significant political and economic interests in 
Rwanda. Nevertheless, Operation Turquoise served a important humanitarian purpose.
88
 
The case of Rwanda played a fundamental role in the evolution of the theory and practice 
of humanitarian intervention and peacekeeping. The SC interpreted the threat to the peace 
and security in a  narrow way, and western key states denied that genocide had occurred in 
Rwanda. The UN had knowledge that genocide was being planned, but the international 
community took little or no action. One more reason for the slow response to Rwanda was 
the absence of USA geopolitical interests in the area and the absence of American 
involvement that was cruicial in Iraq, Bosnia and Somalia. UN failed to take timely 
decisive action by putting a stop to massacres. The UN Secretary General admitted : ”we 
are all  responsible for this disaster, not only the super-powers, but also the African 
countries, the non-governmental organizations, the entire international community. There 
has been a genocide and the world is talking about what it should do. It is a scandal.”89 
5.3.4 Conclusion 
There is an insoluble theoretical problem: how to find a middle position between 
peacekeeping and enforcement. Peacekeeping requires the consent of the parties to the 
conflict and enforcement requires the attribution of responsibility to one side or the other. 
Natural disasters – faminies, floods, earthquakes, etc require humanitarian response, while 
civil conflicts require political response. ”In many contemporary crises, where the state has 
collapsed, leading to the systematic abuse of basic rights and/or genocide, the realistic 
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choice is between allowing the conflict to run its course and intervening to establish a new 
political order from the ground up. There are perils whichever choice is made, but while 
the second choce seems to have been accepted, albeit reluctantly, in former Yugoslavia and 
East Timor, so far it has not been extended to Africa.”90  
5.4 Humanitarian intervention in the Balkans 
5.4.1 Bosnia 
The state of Balkan Peninsula, The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) 
consisted of six republics, namely Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Montenegro, Serbia, Macedonia and two autonomous regions – Kosovo and Vojvodina. 
Each republic and province had its own constitution, supreme court, parliament, president 
and prime minister. At the top of the Yugoslav government were the President (Tito), the 
federal Prime Minister and the federal Parliament.
91
  
Marshal Tito was named President for Life of this multinational state. He was almost 
universally considered as the last great World War II leader, founder of “national 
communism” and first communist that resisted Stalin. Under his strong leadership, 
Yugoslavia‟s historically antagonistic national groups were being held in a stable 
federation. Upon Tito‟s death in 1980 the government structure was rearranged , by 
rotating the Presidency among the six republics. In the lack of a strict leader, the system of 
“brotherhood and unity” dissolved quickly. Ethnic tensions deteriorate and republics 
started to demand autonomy. Croatia and Slovenia proclaimed their sovereignty and 
independence from the SFRY on 25 June 1991. Two days later, the Federal Yugoslav 
Army (JNA) moved into Slovenia and parts of Croatia. The war in Slovenia lasted 10 days 
and the JNA withdrew, but conflict in Croatia intensified. Under pressure from Germany, 
UN granted recognition to Slovenia and Croatia on January 15, 1992.
92
 
Considering the multi-ethnic mixed population of Bosnia, under the climate of 
disintegration of the country, civil strife in Bosnia and Herzegovina was inevitable. The 
result of 1992 referendum was that majority favoured independence. The referendum was 
boycotted by Serbian population and its results rejected. Soon after the declaration of 
independence of Bosnian government on March 3, 1992 and the EC‟s recognition of 
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Bosnia and Herzegovina, the ethnic strife spread and massive human rights violations 
occurred in which all sides of the conflict were involved. The result of this practice were 
close to two million people displaced and hundreds of thousands killed.
93
 
The complexity of the Yugoslav crisis, many interlocutors to deal with, made the 
international community reluctant to intervene. Mediation by EC was the first way of its 
involving, but after attempt to restore peace and dialogue  have failed, SC took some form 
of action to the request of many countries, including Yugoslavia. Resolution 713 on 
September 25, 1991 called “all states to refrain from any action which might contribute to  
increasing tension ” and implemented “complete embargo on all deliveries of weapons and 
military equipment to Yugoslavia”. 
United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) was established by the Resolution 743 
from February 21,1992, to help consolidating the ceasefire and facilitating negotiations. 
Two more Resolutions followed: SC Resolution 752 that called for stop fighting both sides 
and Resolution 757 calling for economic sanctions against Serbia. 
Acting under Chapter VII, SC adopted Resolution 770 on August 13, 1992 which further 
expanded the mandate of UNPROFOR to deliver humanitarian assistance using “all 
measures necessary”. “No-fly “zone over Bosnia was established under the Resolution 781 
with no effect. SC, under Resolution 816 approved the enforcement by NATO fighter 
planes. A series of bombing campaigns against Bosnian Serb positions violated “safe 
havens”. In December 1995, parties started negotiations to end the war. The result was 
Dayton Agreement from November 1995 that ratified and strengthened existing territorial 
divisions and established NATO-led implementation Force for Bosnia (IFOR) with the 
task to oversee the implementation of the  military part of the Peace Plan. Immediately 
after the Dayton Peace Agreement, in 1995 the High Representative for Bosnia and 
Herzegovina was created to oversee the civilian implementation of this agreement. His 
mandate is extended until June 30
th
 2008.
94
 
The goal of Dayton Agreement was the creation of unitary, multiethnic Bosnian state, a 
federal government representing all the people of Bosnia. But for several years after it, 
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reintegration continued and nationalist political parties continued to dominate.
95
 It was not 
surprising for some commentators like political scientist John Mearsheimer from the 
University of Chicago: “History records no instance where ethnic groups have agreed to 
share power in a democracy after a large – scale civil war…The democratic power-sharing 
that Dayton envisions has no precedent.”Due to the pressure of international community, 
Bosnia‟s state reached political and economic reforms. After numerous delays, the Bosnian 
entities agreed on EU-driven police, defense and security reforms. Along with the other 
western Balkan states, Bosnia and Herzegovina seeks eventual full membership in the EU 
and NATO. The full integration of the region after satisfying required conditions, have 
been commited by both institutions. 
UN involvement in the Former Yugoslavian conflict and defining by SC that it is a threat 
to international peace and security, could be justified on several grounds: the massive 
exodus of refugees, heavy loss of human lives, severe humanitarian situation with large 
segments of civilian population deprived of essential supplies and human rights violations 
perpetrated by all sides involved. The situation in the former Yugoslavia showed the 
Security Council‟s preparedness to authorize the use of force for humanitarian reasons. 
5.4.2 Kosovo 
The  Declaration of Independence of Kosovo from July 1990 and the referendum in 1991 
to  confirm the Declaration, were results of Kosovo Albanians long-standing claim for 
independence from Serbia on the basis on the right to self-determination. The parallel 
parliament representing the Ethnic Albanian population of Kosovo proclaimed secessionist 
state Republic of Kosova in 1991 that was only recognized by Albania. The creation of 
parallel structures in education, medical care and taxation and various forms of widespread 
civil disobedience were characteristics of Kosovo Albanians separatist movement. 
During this period, The Kosova Liberation Army (KLA) was founded. In 1996 KLA 
carried a series of attacks against police stations, Serb government officials and Serb 
refugee centers in Kosovo. The US State Department in 1998  listed the KLA as a terrorist 
organization connected with international heroin trade and financing its operations with 
money from Islamic funds including loans from Osama Bin Laden, according to  Interpol 
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report. 
96
 “In 1998, the U.S. State Department listed the KLA as a terrorist organization, 
indicating that it was financing its operations with money from the international heroin 
trade and loans from Islamic countries and individuals, among them allegedly Usama bin 
Laden. Another link to bin Laden is the fact that the brother of a leader in an Egyptian 
Djihad organization and also a military commander of Usama bin Laden, was leading an 
elite KLA unit during the Kosovo conflict“  but the USA armed and trained KLA members 
in Albania sending them back in the summer of 1998 in order to destabilize Kosovo.
97
 
 The number of serbian security forces in the region was increased due to the fact that 
Serbian authorities claimed that KLA is a terrorist organization. The Serb forces launched 
and offensive against KLA that pulled back but reorganized its central command structure 
– divided Kosovo into seven military operational zones, built training camps and bases in 
Albania and even established its own military academy. By February 1998, the KLA had 
been removed from the US State Department‟s terrorism list. 
KLA attacks and Serbian reprisals continued and culminated with the Racak incident on 
January 15, 1999 in which 40 to 45 Kosovo Albanians were killed. The international 
community claimed that casualties were civilians while the government of the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia claimed they were all members of KLA. The incident was the 
turning point of the war. NATO issued a statement that was prepared to launch air strikes 
against Yugoslav targets. The Rambouillet talks began on February 6, 1999 with Javier 
Solana, NATO Secretary General negotiating with both sides. The accords called for 
NATO administration of Kosovo as an autonomous province within Yugoslavia, a force of 
30,000 NATO troops on Yugoslav territory including Kosovo, right or passage for NATO 
troups and immunity for NATO and its agents to Yugoslav law. On 18 March 1999, the 
Albanian, American and British delegation signed the Rambouillet Accords while Serbian 
and Russian delegations refused. After the failure of Rambouillet, the international 
monitors from the OSCE withdrew on March 22, the next day the Serbian assembly 
accepted the principle of autonomy of Kosovo and non-military part of the agreement but 
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not the military part which characterized as “NATO occupation”. NATO bombing began 
the following day, March 24 and ended on June 11, 1999.
98
 
Independent International Commission on Kosovo  in  „The Kosovo Report“ concluded 
that  the NATO military intervention was illegal but legitimate. It was illegal because it did 
not receive prior approval from the United Nations Security Council. However, the 
Commission considers that the intervention was justified because all diplomatic means had 
been exhausted and because the intervention had the effect of liberating the majority 
population of Kosovo from a long period of oppression under Serbian rule.
99
 
 
The Commision claimed that NATO‟s intervention clearly violated Article 2 (4) of UN 
Charter and did not meet the criteria necessary for exemption under Article 51, but 
amongst examiners there are opposite views –that the intervention was legal under 
international law. There are two main arguments for this. First, that NATO alliance had the 
authority under UNSC resolutions regarding Kosovo that was passed before the 
intervention and second that a broader conception of international law is needed in order to 
allow for the preservation of basic human rights. 
In the process of reaching the conclusion about whether NATO alliance had authority to 
intervene in Kosovo, the first logical step is analysis of  Articles 2(4), 2(7) and 51-53 of the 
UN Charter. Article 2(4) states: 
 
All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial 
integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the 
United Nations. 
 
The most common interpretation of this article is that it clearly prohibits non – UNSC 
authorized intervention. 
Article 2(7) states:  
 
Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are 
essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters 
to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle 
shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII 
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This article have also been interpreted as a clear sign that intervention in the internal affairs 
of a recognized state is illegal. 
Regarding Kosovo case, Articles 51, 52 and 53 in Chapter VII are the most relevant. 
Article 51 states that: 
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-
defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security 
Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures 
taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to 
the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the 
Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems 
necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security. 
In the case of Kosovo, there was no threat or armed attack by the state of Yugoslavia upon 
any member states of NATO. In addition, Kosovo was not in a position to file a legal 
request for protection from NATO, being not considered a separate national identity. 
Further, even though Article 52 states that ‟‟Nothing in the present Charter precludes the 
existence of regional arrangements or agencies from dealing with such matters relating to 
the maintenance of international peace and security....“, the ultimate authority of the UN 
SC is provided in Article 53: „no enforcement action shall be taken under regional 
arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council.“ 
Due to the fact that NATO was not authorized by the UN SC, even it was acting to 
maintain peace, it clearly violated Article 53 of the UN Charter. 
Despite these multiple violations of the Charter, some authors, like Mertus, tried to re-
interpret the Article 2(4) claiming:  
By its very terms, the Charter does not prohibit all threats or uses of force. Article 2(4) prohibits force against 
the “territorial integrity or political independence of any state….”As interpreted in the treaties and diplomatic 
history, “territorial integrity” refers not to the “territory of a state” but to the “integrity of the territory.” An 
essential condition of this integrity is the maintenance of certain standards of administration on the territory, 
including the protection of fundamental human rights norms…. Humanitarian intervention in such a case 
falls below the threshold set in Article 2(4) since the interveners do not seek to deprive the state of its 
integrity but, rather, to enhance it.
100
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Her claim that the traditional interpretations of the limitation to intervene have 
significantly changed was not accepted by the Kosovo Commission. 
Regarding the conclusion stated in Kosovo report, that intervention was not legal, but was 
legitimate, in my opinion, Kosovo case is one of the most interesting to analyse legitimacy 
in the light of the danger of abuse. NATO claimed that the targets of the bombing raids 
were strictly military. However, prolonged bombing destroyed communication towers, 
electricity power network, television broadcast facilities, bridges and other transportation 
infrastructure. Many of these targets were far away from the actual verification mission. 
The bombing caused huge economic loss for the FRY that affected the standard of living 
of their citizens and territorial integrity of the state. The fact is that FRY‟s ability to 
maintain peace and security within its own borders was seriously undermined. In addition, 
permanent armed presence in Kosovo region after the end of Kosovo war was a clear 
infringement upon the territorial integrity of the country. 
 “The morality of a particular intervention should be appraised in the light of whether or 
not, in that case, intervenors have in effect aimed their efforts at stopping human rights 
violations. If they have not, if they have abused, then the intervention is morally 
unjustified”101 According to Teson, one possible interpretation is that intervening state 
abuses when it does not aim its action to bring to an end  human rights violations, and it is 
enough to turn intervention into aggression; but the alternative interpretation states that a 
necessary condition for the justification of humanitarian intervention is that the intervenors 
act out of purely humanitarian concerns.” A state acts abusively by this standard if it 
entertains a hidden agenda-if its principal motives are selfish.” Teson has nothing against 
the self-interested action if it does not impair the main humanitarian objective. Teson 
claims that humanitarian intervention is justified not because the motives of the intervenor 
are pure and quots Walzer: “[but because] its various motives converge…on a single 
course of action that [is] also the course of action called for by [the victims of oppression]” 
Considering the views of noninterventionist and supporters of the doctrine of humanitarian 
intervention regarding the question of abuse, it is obvious that their views about whether 
Kosovo intervention was legitimate and morally justified are different. 
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The main problem in the Kosovo case was the fact that two permanent members of UN 
SC, Russia and China were firmly in the opposition of the use of force. As the crisis in 
Kosovo was getting worse, NATO resorted to the use of force despite the clear lack of 
UNSC authorization. In order to avoid this kind of situations in which the Security 
Council, because of lack of unanimity of the permanent members fails to exercise its 
responsibility for the maintenance of  international peace and security, the International 
Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, in its report The Responsibility to 
Protect suggests seeking „support for military action from the General Assembly meeting 
in an Emergency Special Session under the established ‟Uniting for Peace‟ procedures.“ 
(ICISS report 2001, 53) 
The report further states that strong support from the General Assembly could result in 
changing the opinion of veto holders. 
The practical difficulty in all of this is to contemplate the unlikelihood, in any but very exceptional case, of a 
two-thirds majority, as required under the Uniting for Peace procedure, being able to be put together in a 
political environment in which there has been either no majority on the Security Council or a veto imposed or 
threatened by one or more of the permanent members – although Kosovo and Rwanda might just conceivably 
have been such cases 
102
 
Thus, military intervention approved of two-thirds of the General Assembly would still be 
illegal act, but legitimate, considering support of more than 120 nations. 
Due to the fact that NATO lacked a two-thirds majority vote to intervene in Kosovo, it is 
difficult to claim that intervention was legitimate. 
The Kosovo conflict, which culminated in an intensive NATO air campaign, has iniciated 
international interest and attention regarding dilemma should armed humanitarian 
interventions be carried out without the UN‟s authorization. Supporters of the doctrine will 
encourage more Kosovo-like actions as a sign of changes in the customary international 
law, towards the idea that the world is moving towards realizing human rights as an 
integral component of international order, while the opponents will continue to view the 
world quite differently. The opinion that prevails in  international law theory is that the 
doctrine of humanitarian intervention can only be legitimated when adequate proof of 
support by the international community has been obtained. 
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In my opinion, the best way to conclude the topic of Kosovo intervention is to quote the 
Kosovo report once again: 
In conclusion, the NATO war was neither a success nor a failure; it was in fact both. It forced the Serbian 
government to withdraw its army and police from Kosovo and to sign an agreement closely modeled on the 
aborted Rambouillet accord. It stopped the systematic oppression of the Kosovar Albanians. However, the 
intervention failed to achieve its avowed aim of preventing massive ethnic cleansing. Milosevic remained in 
power. The Serbian people were the main losers. Kosovo was lost. Many Serbs fled or were expelled from 
the province. Serbia suffered considerable economic losses and destruction of civilian infrastructure. 
Independent media and NGOs were suppressed and the overall level of repression in Serbia increased. 
103
 
Considering all cases mentioned, it can be concluded that post-Cold War practice suggests 
that states employ more extensive conception of humanitarian intervention. The recent 
cases show a growing support for humanitarian intervention and a significant change in the 
way in which states take action in respond to humanitarian crises. A notion of state 
sovereignty is re-defined and changed towards the view that states are responsible for the 
protection of human rights. 
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6 Humanitarian intervention after 11 September 
The September 11 attacks, the first armed attacks on United States territory since the 
adoption of the UN Charter, put the „war on terror“ on a dominant place in the 
international security programe. The official goals of the War on Terrorism, to prevent 
terrorist attacks, to respond to terrorist threats and to limit the power of terrorist 
organizations, were used to justify unilateral preemptive war. Critics argued that unilateral 
preemptive war can cause human rights abuses and other violations of international law. 
The new foreign policy of  United States, ‟‟The Bush Doctrine“, gives the right to the 
United States to treat countries that harbor or give aid to terrorist groups, as terrorists 
themselves. This policy was used to justify the 2001 invasion of Afghanistan which was 
the beginning of the War on Terror. It was launched by the United States and the United 
Kingdom in response to the September 11, 2001 attacks. The stated purpose of the invasion 
was to remove the Taliban regime as a supporter of al-Qaeda and to capture Osama bin 
Laden and destroy his terrorist organization. Many prisoner abuse cases and tortures were 
claimed as the result of this policy. There are no official figures of civilian deaths caused 
by the invasion, but some individual reports claim from 1,000 to 5,000 civilians as 
casualties. 
The policy also included preventive war, that is considered an act of aggression in 
international law due to its speculative nature. Preventive war is initiated under the belief 
that future conflict is inevitable, though not imminent. Using the policy of preventive war, 
United States should depose foreign regimes that represented a threat to the United States 
security, even if that threat was not immediate. Advocates of preventive war claim that it is 
necessary in today‟s post September 11th world. United States also claim that the policy of 
preventive war is a policy of supporting democracy around the world and of  readiness to 
pursue US military interests in a unilateral way. Critics of the Bush Doctrine are suspicious 
of this readiness claiming that it is contrary to the Just War Theory.
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This policy was used to justify the 2003  invasion of Iraq that was led by United States 
backed by British forces and smaller contigents from other countries. The official reasons 
for the invasion were to “disarm Iraq of weapons of mass destruction, to end Saddam 
Hussein‟s support for terrorism and to free the Iraqi people.“105  Supporters of the invasion 
argued that Iraq‟s leadership has continued the expansion of mass destruction weapons and 
that eliminating the leaders who might authorize new attacks on US territory was the 
purpose of invasion in order to preempt any danger. 
The invasion was strongly opposed by France, Germany and some other allies of  US, 
arguing that it was not justified in the context of  the UNMOVIC‟s report - the United 
Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission  that was formed to continue 
the mandat of UNSCOM to disarm Iraq of its weapons of mass destruction. 
The invasion led to the collapse of the Iraq government and military in about three weeks. 
The majority of deaths and injuries have occured after President Bush declared the end of 
„major combat operations“ on May 1, 2003. Estimates on the number of people killed in 
the invasion and occupation of Iraq are highly disputed. Approximately 7,500 civilians 
were killed during the invasion and more than 60,000 after, while according to Iraq‟s 
Health Minister, between 100,000 and 150,000 Iraqis have been killed. 
It is obvious that the Bush doctrine provides a new definition for the use of US power. It 
has three primary objectives: combat and defeat terrorism, good relations with other great 
powers – Russia, China and India that are no longer defined as „strategic adversaries“ and 
encouraging around the world a model for national success that is stated in National 
Security Strategy (NSS) – freedom, democracy and free enterprise. 
The doctrine is contradictory. It proclaims freedom and, at the same time, closer relations 
with nations that suppress freedoms – China, Russia, etc. Nevertheless, at the heart of this 
doctrine is intention to create a new balance of power in the world, by integrating Russia 
and China into the West in order to reduce threat of significant great power conflict. But, 
tensions between US and the great powers such as the future of Taiwan, non – proliferation 
and China‟s nuclear capability and tensions with Russia due to its relations with the „axis 
of evil countries“ and arguable loyalty to free-market democracy, still remain. 
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 Further, the doctrine is based on a conception of  “preemptive self-defence“ – the use of 
force  “even where there is no reason to believe that an attack is planned and where no 
prior attack has occurred...it is to be distinguished from ‟anticipatory‟ self-defence [that is] 
a narrower doctrine that would authorize armed responses to attacks that are on the brink 
of launch, or where an enemy attack has already occurred and the victim learns more 
attacks are planned“106.  
It is clear that a conception of preemptive self – defence is unlawful under international 
law due to the legal prohibition on the use of force enshrined in Article 2 (4) of  the UN 
Charter, a binding treaty to the all state members. According to O‟Connel, „the SC action 
after September 11 can be cited to support anticipatory self-defence in cases where an 
armed attack has occured and convincing evidence exists that more attacks are planned...in 
other words, a state may not take military action against another state when an attack is 
only a hypothetical possibility, and not yet in progress – even in the case of weapons of 
mass destruction.“ 107 Mere possession of weapons of mass destruction without even a 
threat of use does not amount to an unlawful armed attack. 
The US use of force in Afghanistan can be justified on the basis on the right to self-defence 
considering the serious of coordinated attacks of September 11 that were mounted from 
Afghan territory. Many authors consider that without the removal of the Taliban regimes 
the US would not be able to defend itself against Al Qaeda.
108
  Nevertheless, according to 
the current international order, the US has no right to invade another state on the basis of 
speculative concerns about its possible actions that can happen in the future. In order to 
uphold the rule of law in the world, the US can not have special status and the right on 
preemptive self-defence.
109
  
 Regarding the new doctrine of some states that argue they have the right to use force pre-
emptively, to act unilaterally or in ad hoc coalitions, without agreement in the Security 
Council, UN Secretary General expressed concern that “if  it were to be adopted, it could 
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set precedents that resulted in a proliferation of the unilateral and lawless use of force, with 
or without justification.”110  
It is important “to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, to reestablish the basic 
conditions for justice and the rule of law…The world may have changed,[…],but those 
aims are as valid and urgent as ever.”111  
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7 Concluding remarks 
This thesis has attempted to reach the conclusion whether humanitarian intervention is 
legal and legitimate, through an examination of the evolution of the doctrine and its 
practice. 
Although it is difficult to conclude whether humanitarian intervention is legal or not under 
the UN Charter, critical evaluation of the arguments of both supporters and opponents has 
led to the conclusion that unilateral use of force is prohibited under the UN Charter. On the 
other hand, inspite of the fact that  sovereignty is the foundation of interstate relations, it 
cannot be the excuse for avoiding responsibility of states to protect persons and property 
within their territories. The doctrine of humanitarian intervention is morally necessary in 
today‟s world, but due to the danger of abuse and impartiality of those intervening, it must 
be properly regulated. The UN must establish criterion that must be met before 
humanitarian intervention can be undertaken. 
 The new events in post-September 11 world  challenged a consensus of global solidarity 
and collective security articulated in 2000 Millennium Declaration. The new doctrine 
emerged - some states argue they have right to use force pre-emptively, to act unilaterally 
or in ad hoc coalitions, without agreement in the UN Security Council. UN must confront 
new forms of terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and at the same 
time confront proliferation of the unilateral and lawless use of force. To achieve both aims, 
it is not enough to condemn unilateralism but  structural changes must be made in order to 
make the major organs of United Nations more powerful and efficient. 
In my opinion, there are several conditions that must be met in order to ensure that the 
doctrine is not abused:  the UN SC should be notified by the state planning humanitarian 
intervention; only if SC fails to act within reasonable time, states could intervene 
unilaterally; violations of  human rights must be serious; states should have been employed 
all possible measures short of use of force first – only if those measures are proved 
inadequate and unsatisfactory, the force can be employed; the intervention must end as 
soon as the violations of human rights has been eliminated. 
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The use of force, outside self-defence, should remain illegal until international community 
agree about the use of humanitarian intervention in international treaty. When sovereign 
states are unwilling or unable to protect their own citizens from avoidable catastrophe, that 
responsibility must be borne by the broader community of states. The main questions are 
who should exercise that responsibility, under whose authority and when, where and how 
in order to avoid the possibility of abuse of the doctrine. International community still did 
not find the answers. A new international consensus on these issues is extremely needed. 
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